In the 19th century, the Crimean War became an unexpected test for the imperial system, revealing technological and organizational lag. Half a century later, the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated that the ability to adapt to new conditions remained limited. World War I ended with a crisis in state administration, while the Afghan campaign became a symbol of the gradual depletion of late USSR resources. These episodes are rarely directly compared, but they share one feature: a system built on vertical logic struggles with prolonged conflicts.

Events of the past two years show that certain structural problems persist. The first weeks of the Special Military Operation were based on assumptions that later proved incorrect: expectations of a quick campaign, underestimation of resistance, and reliance on limited force application. Once it became clear that the conflict was taking a different course, logistical and organizational solutions had to be adjusted during ongoing operations.

At the tactical level, the situation appears equally contradictory. Russian units demonstrate high resilience in certain areas of the front, yet often act in predictable patterns. The vertical decision-making model limits the initiative of mid-level commanders — the very factor that usually ensures flexibility on the battlefield. As a result, many episodes resemble approaches from earlier wars, not fully accounting for 21st-century realities.

The economy also imposes constraints. Sanctions have not led to the collapse of Russian industry but have significantly complicated the production of high-tech goods. The defense industry is operating at full capacity, yet dependency on imported components remains, particularly in electronics, optics, and engines. Mass reproduction of equipment comparable to Western models remains challenging.

The technological factor is no less important. The Russian army actively employs drones, electronic warfare tools, and precision systems, but a significant portion of these solutions relies on imports. Any fluctuations in external markets or political restrictions noticeably affect operational capabilities.

International dynamics also shape the context. Countries supporting Russia do so primarily based on their own interests. China seeks to minimize risks associated with direct support while simultaneously gaining economic advantages. Therefore, the real volume of external assistance is less stable than it might appear.

The domestic political system, built on vertical governance, limits the speed of adaptation. Decisions are made in a narrow circle, and critical information is often filtered before reaching the top. This reduces the ability to adjust strategy in real time.

All these factors do not imply an immediate weakening of the military machine. Rather, they outline limits that become evident specifically in a long-term conflict. History shows that such constraints are not new for Russia — and they define the real scope of its capabilities, both on the battlefield and in the economy.